staffwriter

Staffwriter is a blog operated by freelance journalist/author, Martin Dillon. It deals with international events, behind the headlines stories, current affairs, covert wars, conflcts, terrorism, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, Middle East issues. Martin Dillon's books are available at Amazon.com & most other online shops.

Friday, February 13, 2009

IRAN A NATO ALLY IN AFGHAN WAR?

When Iran launched a satellite into space on February 3 the reaction among military hawks in the corridors of power in Israel was a case of we told you so. It had the immediate effect of raising the stakes in a war of words in which Israel is constantly implying that is considering, if not actively planning, a surgical strike to take out Iran’s nuclear plants and its missile development facilities.
The satellite, called Omid, meaning hope, was described by Iran as a vehicle for earthquake monitoring and telecommunications yet the U.S. State Department said it was a matter of grave concern that Iran now had a technical ability, which could be used in the its long range missile program. That was a somewhat curious reaction since it was clear a year ago when Iran launched one of its newest missiles that it had the technical expertise to launch a small payload into low space orbit. The State Department also reminded the international community that there were U.N. measures in place calling on countries to restrict the sale of certain types of technology to Iran. The State Department approach appeared to be aimed at showing solidarity with Israeli and with pro-Israel elements in the U.S.
In Tel Aviv, security figures told media outlets that this was a new and worrying development and that it underscored Iran’s military ambitions. It could, some of them claimed, lead to Iran being able to launch nuclear weapons long distances. That implied Iran could, in the not too distant future, strike at America. But not everyone in Israel is frightened by Iran’s space program. In August, 2008 when Iran successfully tested the missile used in this latest satellite launch, a former head of Israel’s Space Agency, Yitzhak Ben Israel, dismissed warnings from security experts, pointing out that much of the commentary about Iran’s space program was exaggerated. He said Iran was building unsophisticated satellites of a type that students at Israel’s aviation institute had built a decade ago. But, experts like Tal Inbar at Israel’ space research facilities said it was a sophisticated effort by Iran and represented a serious turning point, which had far reaching consequences for Israel’s security.
The launch of Omid came on the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution and was seen by many as an attempt by the country’s president, Ahmadinejad, to increase his popularity with the masses ahead of June elections. Overall, his image has been tarnished by diplomatic gaffes so the satellite launch may well have been designed to restore his standing as the person who promised to take his nation into the space age. Nowadays, Iranians look to India an example of what can be achieved technologically as a way of improving a country’s international standing. For example, India, much like China, has an advanced space program with plans for a manned moon landing and for the launch of probes to Mars before 2020. It is also a member of what is called the nuclear club.
In contrast, Iran is an amateur in the space race. In the opinion of most defense experts, it is far behind India in missile and space development. Even if Iran could produce enough enriched uranium to make a small nuclear device there is no evidence it possesses the technical ability to be able to fit such a device to a missile. Nevertheless, every move by Iran is closely watched by Israel and as a consequence by Washington. During the Bush presidency, the Israelis wanted to a strike at Iran and may even have had the backing of Vice President, Dick Cheney.
Joe Biden, Dick Cheney’s successor did not respond to news of the satellite launch but instead offered an olive branch to the Iranians, pointing out that if they abandoned their nuclear program and their support for terrorism there could be “meaningful incentives” for them. The diplomatic tone of the message was in stark contrast to the initial State Department reaction. It seemed to indicate that the overall view of the Obama administration was that Iran’s launch of a small satellite into low orbit was not that big an issue. Biden’s comments could easily have been construed as a signal to some in Israel that it was not a time to be ramping up the rhetoric. It certainly had the effect of silencing the Israeli government. Its leading spokesman declined to comment when asked about Iran’s space ambitions. Yet, within the Israeli military hierarchy there was a deep conviction that Iran’s need for a satellite was more than just about monitoring earthquakes and routing telecommunications. It was put in orbit, they claim, to give Iran advance warning of any Israeli attack on his nuclear or missile facilities.
For the U.S., there is a lot at stake in seeking to open a dialogue with Iran rather than feeding into Israeli fears and allowing hawks in Israel to continue to advocate strikes against Iran. It has not been lost on the Obama administration, as well as NATO generals in charge of the war in Afghanistan, and a growing insurgency in Pakistan, that it would be better to have Iran as an ally. It is a nation of Shia Muslims, bordering Afghanistan, and it has no love for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, who are Sunni Arabs. At the outset of the invasion of Afghanistan, Iran offered to help the Bush Administration but the overture was rejected because neocons in Washington had already decided that Iran was part of what later became known as “the axis of evil.”
NATO has already made it clear to Washington that it would like to see a diplomatic outreach to Iran because of continued instability in Pakistan, and the Pakistani military’s failure to curb it, is threatening NATO supply routes into Afghanistan. Now, with the forced closure of the U.S. base in Kyrgyzstan, and the blowing up of bridges in the Khyber Pass, the Iranian port of Chabahar is beginning to look like an ideal transit point to ship NATO supplies into Afghanistan. The NATO commander in Afghanistan, General John Craddock, has indicated that NATO would not block individual members doing a deal with Iran for the “transit of supplies."
If that were to happen, it would change the dynamics of the America - Iran relationship. It would also imply that, behind the scenes, Washington, with NATO’s help, has closed in on a deal with Iran to give up its nuclear enrichment ambitions in return for full diplomatic relations and what Vice-President Biden called “meaningful incentives.” In such a scenario, the recent missile launch by Iran would quickly become an issue hawks in Israel would not be able to exploit. It would also solve serious problems facing NATO as it awaits a surge of U.S. troops numbering as many as 30,000. Those troops, and the ones already on the battlefield, will need a supply line that is not being constantly threatened. If Iran were to guarantee secure supply lines that would represent a major political shift but, like so much else about the turbulent politics of that region, we will have to wait and see if a significant reversal of the American-Iran relationship is truly possible.

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

SECRET TALKS AHEAD OF OFFENSIVE AIMED AT TALIBAN

Secret talks are taking place with the Taliban even as the U.S. and its NATO allies are getting ready to launch a major offensive against them, and as the Pakistan military prepares for a push into tribal areas, including the once quiet and picturesque Swat Valley. All of this comes at a time when the Taliban have increased their stranglehold on parts of Pakistan and are threatening NATO supply lines into Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, behind the scenes the Saudis are holding secret talks with members of the inner circle of Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar. The aim is to forge a dialogue between the U.S., Pakistan, the Afghan government and the Taliban. The Saudis were big supporters of Taliban fighters in the 1980s when they were battling the Soviets under the banner of “The Mujahideen.” A decade later, rich Saudis financed Taliban-run religious schools, which preached an extreme form of Islam. Now, Saudi Arabia sees itself as a mediator and has been acting in that role for over a year. In late 2008, representatives of the Saudi government held talks with Taliban leaders, making sure not to attract media attention. As part of the process, the U.S. released several important Taliban fighters from detention at Bagram airbase so they could take part in a dialogue about how to resolve the conflict.
But those secret talks have not deterred the Taliban from tightening their grip on parts of Pakistan and of building a stronger presence in Afghanistan. That appears to indicate that if the Taliban were to engage in formal talks towards a settlement of the Afghan problem they would wish to do so from a position of strength. While Afghanistan is an issue the incoming Obama administration intends to tackle with a big troop increase, the threat from the Taliban in Pakistan is much more worrying. It has taken years for U.S. and NATO military planners to recognize that the problems of Afghanistan have been steadily flowing into Pakistan since 2001 and subsequently feeding back into Afghanistan, fueling an insurgency in both countries. It was only in 2008 that NATO realized the Khyber Pass, through which NATO receives most of its supplies, had become an unstable region due to insurgent activity, which emanated not only from the Taliban but also from foreign fighters and Islamic militant groups that have sprung up throughout Pakistan’s tribal provinces.
After the defeat of the Taliban, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, many Taliban fighters fled across the border to Pakistan where they were welcomed in provinces like Waziristan. For the next four years, they rebuilt their organization and expanded to other tribal areas, unhindered by the Pakistan military or its intelligence services, which historically had close links with them. By the end of 2005, Taliban leaders had agreed that their goal was to defeat NATO in Afghanistan and create a Pashtun state within Pakistan itself. They also reached an informal arrangement with the Pakistan military, headed by General Pervez Musharraf, that neither side would attack the other. That ensured the Taliban were able to expand and operate in tribal regions with impunity. It also allowed Al Qaeda to regroup and over time to insert its fighters into Taliban ranks.
Just like they did when they controlled Afghanistan, the Taliban have burned down schools and imposed strict Islamic rules on the areas they rule. Even in the Swat Valley where there is a large Pakistan military presence the Taliban operate openly and run their own Sharia courts. Much of the Taliban’s growing influence has developed under the noses of the Pakistan authorities and beyond the gaze of western intelligence agencies who for too long paid little heed to what was occurring in Pakistan. Last year, there were more suicide bombs attacks in Pakistan than there were in Afghanistan. As a consequence, the Pakistan military is finding it difficult to contain a growing insurgency that stretches from the Afghan border into the Peshawar, the capital of the North West Frontier Province and even into Islamabad, the nation’s capital. Militants have also been recruiting and organizing in Karachi, the main port and industrial center.
The Pakistani military comes from within the second largest Muslim population in the world, numbering 173 millions, and as such has always shown a reluctance to deal with its own people, many of whom share a deep suspicion of the West and an Arabist view of the world. The majority is Sunni, hence the close ties to Saudi Arabia, which has one million Pakistani immigrants within its borders.
For the U.S. and its allies, the use of predator drones, and Special Forces teams, to strike at Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan is not enough to dampen the threat and growth of the insurgency there. Essentially, it is the job of the Pakistan military to establish the rule of law over tribal lands but the military is finding difficult to handle the task because the problem was allowed to fester for too long. Close to three hundred people, including civilians, insurgents and members of the Pakistan security forces were killed in January and just as many injured. In one incident in the Swat Valley, the Taliban beheaded six captured soldiers in a town square. They also murdered a rival cleric and eight of his entourage. They constantly kill people in public, claiming they are spies for the U.S. and the Pakistani security forces. In that way, they establish a reign of terror that prevents local people from opposing them or informing on them. They have also had no difficulty acquiring weapons because Pakistan and Afghanistan are both awash with guns, many of them having been supplied to the Mujahideen by the U.S. in the 1980s. The Taliban have also raided security forces’ arsenals in outposts along the Afghan border and have disarmed militias paid by the U.S. and Pakistani-Afghan authorities to confront them.
Pakistan’s central government would prefer to see a negotiated settlement with the Taliban but that may not be what the Taliban have in mind while they ramp up the violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. From a NATO perspective, defeating the Taliban cannot be achieved unless the Pakistan military is fully engaged. The Obama administration has made it clear to Pakistan that it will not get billions in aid if its military does not toe the Washington line. The U.S. and its NATO allies reckon if there is ever to be a successful exit from Afghanistan, it can only happen when the Taliban have been deprived of bases in Pakistan. That has to be the prerequisite for gaining the upper hand in future talks with the insurgents. The only problem is whether the forthcoming offensive, especially in Pakistan’s tribal regions, it too little too late. Some observers now see the parts of Pakistan controlled by the Taliban as a state within a state. If that were true, it poses a serious threat to the future stability of Pakistan. Whatever the outcome of the planned offensive, it is unlikely the Taliban will be defeated. That will leave the Saudis with plenty of opportunity to undo some of the damage they did by funneling tens of millions of dollars to the Taliban over the years for the building of madrassa schools that provided a constant supply of young fighters to the war against the U.S.in Afghanistan and elsewhere. It will be up to the Saudis to demand that the Taliban enter formal talks to seek an end to the conflict in Afghanistan. However, even that might not resolve the problems the Pakistan military will continue to face over who controls large swathes of the nation.

US AND ALLIES DIFFER ON AFGHAN WAR PLANS

While the U.S. prepares to send at least 25,000 more troops to Afghanistan, many European allies are refusing to follow suit. Some are even considering reducing the numbers of soldiers they have on the battlefield.
That is just one example of the ways in which Europeans differ from the Obama administration in planning a strategy for Afghanistan. Another is that Germany and France would like to see what has loosely been termed “a contact group” of counties leading the way to a solution of the conflict. The “contact group” would include Russia and China, thereby involving the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Membership would also be extended to Pakistan and Iran, which border Afghanistan, and to India which, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November, has taken a keen interest in events in Afghanistan.
The concept of expanding the range of countries involved in the Afghan war was first proposed at a NATO summit in 2006 by former French president, Jacques Chirac. It found favor with the Germany, which argued it was better to have more hands at the wheel. The U.S. delegation at the summit, led by then Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, angrily opposed the idea and warned that it would create a command structure that lacked focus. From Washington’s perspective, the proposal risked ceding U.S. policy in the region to China and Russia. In the end, Condoleezza Rice convinced the summit to abandon the proposal.
Lately, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel has resurrected it amid reports that she and French president, Nicholas Sarkozy see it as a way of lessening the burden of the Afghan war on NATO. Following Barack Obama’s inauguration, Merkel indicated she was not in favor of sending more German troops to Afghanistan, signaling that a new strategy was required. France has said it is reluctant to increase its 2,600 contingent and other E.U. nations like Holland want to reduce their troop commitment. In Britain too, there is growing disquiet about the war but the Labour government is unlikely to support the “contact group” strategy if the Obama administration, like its predecessor, opposes it. However, senior political figures have publicly expressed concerns about the war. Recently, Lord Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats, who served with the British Army in N. Ireland, criticized the “international community” for having no clear plan for Afghanistan. He said it was “a scandal, wasting the lives” of young men and women on the front lines. He issued a dire warning that if NATO did not come up with a victory plan soon the war against the Taliban could be lost. He added that commanders on the ground had agreed with him that NATO had failed to take advantage of its victories against the Taliban.

So, even if Germany and France cannot push through the 2006 Chirac initiative to widen responsibility for the war, there will still be major disagreements between the U.S. and some of its allies over battlefield strategy and the political future of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. With Afghan elections scheduled for this year, there have been leaked reports that the Obama administration is not a fan of Karzai because it believes he has failed to eradicate corruption in his government, thereby weakening the political process. It is said the U.S. would prefer a coalition of his peers to run the country and set a new example for governance. Some of his political opponents have already told Washington that they intend to oppose him and would like the U.S. to publicly state that it would prefer him to step down.
Karzai has detected the growing opposition from Washington and from Pakistan, a nation he has consistently blamed for many of his country’s ills. But, he feels confident that, while he is supported by France and Germany, his tenure as president is secure and he will be re-elected president. Much to the annoyance of Pakistan, he has established close ties to India, a big player in the region that has Washington’s ear. Lately, he has shrewdly played to the growing clamor among his own people for tighter controls on NATO operations and especially on raids by U.S. Special Forces. In several public statements he pointed to the fact the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan found that 400 civilians were killed in air raids last year. In many instances, the air power was called in by Special Forces teams which had found themselves outgunned. Karzai has constantly demanded more accountability from NATO for civilian casualties and in doing so has enhanced his image with Afghans. He also knows that as a Pashtun his departure from power would be viewed by his tribe as a slight by Washington.
One other area in which the U.S. and its allies may differ in the months ahead is in the prosecution of the war. The fact more U.S. troops will be on the battlefield will see Washington calling the shots when it comes to deciding military strategy. As a consequence, it will not favor, as some Europeans do, the Karzai principle that the Afghan military should be consulted about all NATO operations and given advance warning about proposed Special Forces raids. Put simply, the U.S. military feels it cannot trust its Afghan counterparts with sensitive intelligence. There is also a disagreement among NATO members about using a tactic from the Iraq war, namely creating militias and paying tribal elders to fight the Taliban. The aim is to create a type of “Afghan Awakening” to mirror the way Sunni militias were paid to fight Al Qaeda in Anbar province in Iraq. Afghan president, Hamid Karzai is opposed to the use of militias, arguing that there are enough weapons in the country without adding more to the mix.
In contrast, Lord Ashdown supports the U.S. strategy of militias and the surge of more U.S. combat troops but he remains convinced that many countries are not pulling their weight. He claims the “international community,” by which he means the U.S. and its NATO allies, is merely trying to stabilize Afghanistan rather than planning to win the war. He points to the fact that only 1/25th of the military and 1/50th of the aid that was used in the Bosnian conflict is now being committed to the Afghan war.
If he is right, and there is no reason to doubt him because he was the International High Representative in Bosnia for four years, the Obama administration will have to think carefully if it wants to win the Afghan war. By Ashdown’s calculations, winning would require a troops’ surge of immense proportions, which is a strategy America’s NATO allies will not support. Therefore, can the goal for President Obama be to win the war or should he simply seek to stabilize Afghanistan and plan for an exit within a decade? While the President ponders those options he might also want to keep a close eye on Pakistan, which is steadily becoming mired in terror generated by an unchecked Taliban, which is asserting itself throughout the country. In 2008, the Taliban killed more people in Pakistan than they killed in Afghanistan. More worrying, for the U.S. and its allies is the realization that Pakistan is a nuclear nation.