AMERICAN-BRITISH GENERALS DIFFER ON TACTICS

British and American generals are at loggerheads about how to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and their disagreements mirror a fundamental flaw in the way military strategists in both camps define counter insurgency.
The first signs of discord began after May 2006 when the British were given the task of controlling Helmand Province. The central government of Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, had already shown it could not bring stability to the region and its security forces were regarded by locals as brutal, corrupt and ineffective. As a consequence, many people supported either the Taliban or local warlords.
Helmand mattered a lot to Karzai because he reckoned that eliminating the Taliban there would send a message to rest of the country that they could be defeated. But, Helmand also held a special significance for insurgents because some former Taliban leaders and a lot of its best, young fighters before and after 9/11 were from tribes in the area. Many senior Taliban figures fled to Helmand after the US invasion, following on the heels of the defeat of Taliban leader, Mullah Omar and his militias in their stronghold at Kandahar.
The British strategy to defeat the Taliban was based on a long history of fighting insurgencies in British colonial emergencies in the 20th century, in places as far away as Kenya, Aden and Cyprus. In more recent times, the British also gained considerable experience in anti-terrorism warfare, or what is often called counter-insurgency, by combating the IRA for several decades. Those conflicts provided the British with a wealth of knowledge and important lessons on how to defeat insurgents. First, it is vital win the hearts and mind of the local population. Second, local elements can be empowered to act as intelligence agents and can be trained and armed to counter the insurgents in their own communities. Any action by an occupying power that alienates the local population is therefore counter-productive because it serves the aims of the insurgents. It can also provide the enemy with ready-made propaganda, or recruits, and possibly both.
In 2006, the 6,000 strong British force quickly set about wooing the local population with promises of reconstruction. British commanders opposed US demands to destroy the poppy crop, which was the only source of revenue for many poor farmers. From a British perspective, it was a negative policy to destroy the crop before creating industry and jobs. The British also criticized the US military’s use of heavy air power to support its small bands of Special Forces that operated throughout the country, especially in Helmand. British commanders felt massive air strikes were killing innocent civilians and making the task of winning over the locals much more difficult. For example, in one incident, 57 civilians were killed, many of them women and children. In a surprising move in August 2007, a British commander openly called for the removal of US Special Forces from his region. He pointed out that because Special Forces teams could not deal with large groups of insurgents they called in airpower with resulting civilian casualties.
While that debate pointed to a growing war of words about tactics, other issues quickly added to further tensions between generals. One was secret deals the British negotiated with the Taliban. The deals were called ceasefire arrangements by some and capitulation by others. They required both sides to pull back from several population centers.
But, the biggest disagreement about tactics is the one that is now raging and causing a serious rift at the highest levels of NATO, as well as in the corridors of power in London and Washington. It concerns British plans to train and arm village militias to fight the Taliban. The strategy has the backing of the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, who recently said Britain would expand its plans for “community defense initiatives” in HelmandelmandHelmand. He stressed the policy would be based on the Afghan principle known as “Arbakai, a tradition in part of the country whereby local militias banded together to confront a threat their communities. It is clear the British favor exploiting this tradition because they successfully employed similar tactics in Kenya and Aden. Later, the US used the Hmong tribes in much the same way during the Vietnam War. From a British perspective, arming Afghan militias could create a counter-insurgency force with vital local knowledge. British generals argue it is necessary because the Afghan police force is outgunned, corrupt and thin on the ground.
American generals say the British will seriously undermine their efforts to re-train and re-build the police force. They also point out that armed militias that could end up being controlled by corrupt warlords. In a sign tensions within NATO have reached boiling point, the US general in charge of restructuring the police, Maj. Gen. Robert Cone, has openly criticized his British counterparts. The result has been heated exchanges between diplomats in London and Washington. Cone and his command believe the British plan is too much like their disastrous effort to create an Afghan auxiliary force, a project that was abandoned in 2007.
Cone is not alone in condemning the British move. The US commander in Afghanistan, General Dan Neill, has told reporters the British strategy will fail. His said his knowledge of Afghan history indicated that the “Arbakai” community militia system worked in only few a few areas of the country and Helmand was not one of them. His comments represented a stern put down of his British counterparts and, as if to rub more salt into the wound, Maj. Gen. Cone added that the $7.4 billion the US has set aside to re-build the police force would eventually create a force that was highly trained – a force of which the Afghan people could be proud. He said he backed greater community support and involvement with the police.
Overall, the US top brass see the British strategy undercutting their plans to make the police force the vehicle to defeat the Taliban. And, for its part the Pentagon is also angry. It feels that, with more than $7 billion earmarked to make the Afghan police force the preferred weapon of choice, the British are putting a spanner in the works by going off in the opposite direction. In the midst of this battle of ideas, the Afghan government has weighed in and made it clear it will expel any diplomats who engage in secret talks with insurgents. To show it was serious, it recently sent packing two EU and UN diplomats after they met Taliban commanders to talk about conflict resolution.
The debate about arming community groups is not confined to Afghanistan where some UN observers argue it will undercut efforts to disarm militias through the country. It also has echoes in Iraq where the US, much to the consternation of the Shiite dominated government in Baghdad, has been arming and training Sunni insurgents to fight Al Qaeda. Some observers fear those insurgents will one day turn their weapons on Iraqi government forces after the US withdraws.

IRAQ - THE SURGE AND THE REALITY

While the Pentagon and White House, as well as many in Congress declare the surge in Iraq a success, little is said about the fact that as many as 24,000 Iraqi civilians died in 2007, representing the second highest casualty figure since the invasion in 2003.
Most of the dead were from areas outside of the capital Baghdad where the surge has been concentrated thereby indicating a drastic increase in violence in other parts of the country. While there is no doubt the surge has reduced high levels of sectarian deaths in the capital, the facts show a drastic increase in killings elsewhere.
The problem with representing the surge as a major success is that the overall picture of life in the country is obscured and the level of human tragedy minimized. If one compares last year’s death toll with the death toll on 9/11, the Iraqi civilian casualty toll in 2007 was 800% higher. That does even account for the numbers of civilians injured and maimed for life, or for the dead and wounded within the ranks of US military and its coalition partners. In 2007, there were close to 900 US military deaths and 5,648 wounded. Forty-seven British soldiers were also killed. Those figures hid yet another statistic, namely the numbers of soldiers evacuated from Iraq for treatment related to behavioral and psychiatric issues. Some reports have suggested that close to 1,000 soldiers from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, have been treated at the Army medical facilities at Landsthul in Germany. Most were from Iraq and fell into the category of victims of “mental trauma.”
The undeniable success of the troop surge in lowering US casualties and reducing the chaos in Baghdad obscured another troubling aspect of the Iraq campaign in 2007, namely that the US military and “contractor” personnel killed over 600 civilians between June and November. Among the dead were women and children, with 23 children killed by US fire in October alone. In a US raid near Lake Thar Thar, north of Tikrit, the birthplace of the late Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, fifteen women and children died in a US air raid. One of the women was pregnant. When it comes to compensating the relatives of victims of what is euphemistically defined as “collateral damage in the war on terror,” the Pentagon and wealthy companies running private armies of “contractors” have been, at the very least penny pinching.
Approximately $8,000 was paid by the Pentagon to two children who lost their mother when the taxi in which she was traveling came under fire. The vehicle was said to have run a checkpoint. The children were alongside their mother when she died and were also injured. A measly “condolence” payment of $500 was paid to the family of a deaf man shot outside a museum in Samarra and a larger “condolence” payment of $2,500 was granted to the parents of a 4-year-old girl who died when a bullet fired from a Humvee struck her. A report of the incident claimed the bullet was fired to clear traffic at an intersection but struck a post, ricocheted and hit the girl. In another incident that the US military agreed was a case of “negligent fire,” an Iraqi ambulance driver was shot dead on his way to a bomb scene by a coalition soldier. The dead man’s family was compensated with a payment of $2,500.
The most reliable figures for the death toll in Iraq are kept by Iraq Body County(IBC), a non-profit agency that compiles its data from media reports that are authenticated, as well as hospital and morgue records, and material supplied by NGO’s and official Iraqi organizations. IBC never offers estimates of the numbers killed at any given time and reports only violent civilian deaths. The agency was established by volunteers from Britain and the US in 2003 to ensure that the civilian death toll was reflected in coverage of the war, following statements by then US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld that the US occupation forces did not keep track of civilian casualties. IBC has not shirked from questioning reports by other sources, like the esteemed medical journal, Lancet, when it declared an estimate of 600,000 Iraqi civilian deaths. That raised skepticism within the IBC. While it accepted that more deaths occurred than were ever reported, it argued that the Lancet method of reaching such a high number did not stand up to serious scrutiny. Nevertheless, IBC reckons that at least 100,000 Iraqi civilians have died since 2003. It pays little heed to the much heralded success of the surge by politicians like presidential candidate, Sen. John Mc Cain. Instead, it makes the following point:
“For some 24,000 Iraqi civilians and their families, 2007 was a year of devastating and irreparable tragedy. The casualty figures show beyond any reasonable doubt that civil security in Iraq remains in a perilous state.”
From the perspective of Gen. David Petraeus, the US commander in charge of the surge, the rosy picture of Iraq presented by politicians on the presidential stump, does not exactly square with his reading of the situation. While he stresses the need to build on what was accomplished in 2007, he warns that success cannot be compared to “flipping a light switch.” His use of that phrase suggests it would be unwise to think the battle is won and that the mission has been accomplished.

IRAN-RUSSIA A TEAM TO WATCH

While the US and EU huffed and puffed about Iran in 2007, Moscow established closer energy links with Teheran that will be well worth watching in 2008 and possibly for the next two decades.
Much of the credit for the developing ties between the two energy giants can be attributed to outgoing Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who has been determined to forge an alliance with Iran, thereby giving both countries control of 50% of the world’s gas reserves, and as much as 20% of the world’s oil. Putin was shrewd enough to see that an energy pact was possible because the state machinery in both countries exercised total control over energy matters, making it easier for their respective governments to reach agreement on a way forward. The implications of this are enormous for Washington and for its future relations with the EU and NATO countries that are highly reliant on gas and oil imports. It is estimated that within two decades European nations will be importing 90% or more of their oil supplies and gas needs.
And where are Europeans likely to turn to for their energy supplies in the years ahead? The answer is already clear. It will be Russia and Iran, much to the consternation of Washington that fears Russia will exploit energy as a weapon to detach Europeans from America’s embrace. Last year, there was evidence some EU governments were not prepared to tow the US line to avoid dependence on Russian gas supplies. In May 2007, Austria, much to the consternation of the White House and US corporate energy giants, signed a deal with the massive Russian conglomerate, Gazprom, to build a routing center for Russian gas supplies into the EU. Italy and Germany have since come on board, making it clear that the three countries regard Russia as a reliable energy partner and supplier. Germany appears willing to follow suit. Gazprom plans to send its gas through a pipeline stretching from Russia into the Bulgarian port of Bourgas on the Black Sea and onwards to Greece and Italy. An offshoot of the pipeline will snake through Rumanian to Austria.
Western energy experts have warned Washington that as more EU countries become reliant on Russian energy, the greater the likelihood will be that Russia will seek to use its gas and oil monopoly to expand its influence into Europe, and particularly into those East European countries that were once part of the Soviet Union but are now EU members. Others like Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus are swiftly learning that Russia links energy to its foreign policy.
But it is not just Russia that will be a major player in the energy game in 2008 and in decades to come. Iran stands to make similar inroads into Europe with Russia’s help. That will specifically benefit Russia because, as a partner with Iran, it will not have to compete with the Iranians for the growing energy needs within the EU. Russia has also bolstered Iranian plans to supply China with oil and gas via a pipeline through Pakistan and India. Washington has, however, cleverly stymied that plan by using its new strategic relationship with India to block the proposed route through its territory. Consequently, Russia has angrily accused the US of trying to prevent China acquiring the energy supplies it needs in its onward march to superpower status.
The energy battles may be occurring behind the headlines but they have the potential for making headlines in the year ahead and for decades to come. In 2007, the US did not fare well in the energy wars across the globe, except perhaps in Iraq where US oil giants, with backing from the White House, worked hard to negotiate a deal whereby they will control a large slice of that country’s reserves long after US troops have been withdrawn. Elsewhere, Washington has been outmaneuvered by Russia. Vladimir Putin’s historic visit to Teheran on October 16, 2007, was less about the Iranian nuclear debate and more about cementing a significant energy relationship. It came in the middle of four official meetings between the energy ministers of both nations. Then there was the Turmenistan gas debacle in which Washington lost out to Moscow for the rights to Turkmen supplies. In that part of the world, US companies trying to negotiate deals with nations that have oil and gas rights within the Caspian Basin have found the going tough because Russian energy giants like Gazprom have been prepared to outbid US companies like Chevron and Exxon Mobil. Some critics in the West see the Russian bear at work, building an energy monopoly in order to win back gains it lost at the end of the Cold War. Others say Russia is doing what capitalists always wanted it to do. It is allowing the market to determine energy prices. One thing is clear. When Vladimir Putin came to power he quickly understood that if Russia was to resume its place on the world stage it had to exploit the monetary and political power its massive energy resources offered. Now, he has gone further by forging a partnership with Iran, which will make Russia joint controller of a large slice of the world’s energy resources.

OLD COMMUNIST ALLIES SET TO SQUARE OFF

Two old communist allies, China and Vietnam could be heading for more than just a diplomatic collision in 2008 over competing rights to massive oil and gas reserves under parts of the China Sea.
In 2007, the leaders of both countries exchanged heated words and for the first time, the Vietnamese authorities permitted hundreds of students in the country’s capital, Hanoi to stage protests outside the Chinese embassy with banners condemning Chinese aggression and calling for Vietnam to stand up to the Chinese bully. There was a similar demonstration outside the Chinese delegation offices in Ho Chi Minh City.
The dispute over natural resources in the South China has been ongoing for two decades but has rarely made headlines in the West even though the Chinese navy has fired on Vietnamese vessels and detained Vietnamese fishermen. The most serious clashes were in 1998 when Chinese naval vessels opened fire on a Vietnamese gunboat landing soldiers on a reef in a disputed area called the Spratly Islands. And, in April 2007, a Chinese frigate fired on a Vietnamese fishing craft, killing one of the crew and injuring others. April, tensions have remained high and with China’s desperate need for oil and gas, there could well be a dangerous escalation of the dispute in the coming year.
China needs as much oil and gas as it can get to maintain the staggering growth of its infrastructure and to achieve its aim of becoming a super power. It has not only threatened Vietnam on the high seas but also Japan over islands it claims the rights to in the same region – islands that are sitting atop oil and gas fields. But the dispute with Vietnam pits China against a former ally that will be taking up a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2008. And, unlike the past when Vietnam was politically isolated, China is now looking at a country that has good relations with East and West. It is supported by Russia and has normalized its relations with the US. It has also established diplomatic ties to Brazil and the EU. It acquired a place on the World Trade Organization with the backing of the US and Russia, giving it a respectability on the international stage.
The areas at the heart of the China-Vietnam “conflict” are in the South China Sea, in a region Vietnam likes to call the East Sea and which it claims has been legally defined as Vietnamese territory. China declared the area part of the Chinese province of Hainan and set up a military-diplomatic outpost on a small island. To further project its claim to ownership, China held naval exercises in the disputed zone. To Vietnam it was a typical example of Chinese belligerence but the Vietnamese avoided a major confrontation, preferring to ask ASEAN – the Association of South East Asia Nations – to persuade the Chinese to back off.
Appeals by ASEAN to Beijing led to a meeting of Chinese and Vietnamese diplomats but little was achieved and the Chinese navy has continued to patrol the area in dispute. BP has suspended a costly exploration survey that was commissioned by Vietnam It was being conducted off the Vietnamese coastline in yet another area, known as block 5.2 that China claims it owns. A similar project by India’s state-owned energy company was also abandoned after China warned the Indian government it was operating in Chinese territorial waters. The project which was costing upwards of $125 million was in what Vietnam had defined as blocks 127/128 directly opposite the country’s central coastline.
Vietnam is not intimidated by China and that is why there is potential for a serious conflict. The two countries squared off in 1979 over China’s support for the Khmer Rouge that killed millions of civilians in Cambodia in a campaign often referred to as The Killing Fields. The blood thirsty Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, was not only supported by China but fled there when the Vietnamese ended his reign. He later died in exile in Beijing. China responded to the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge by starting a border war with Vietnam. The Chinese sent upwards of 90,000 troops into Vietnam suffered large casualties. There are varying figures for the number io dead but China later admitted to 7,000 dead and 15,000 injured. The invasion was short-lived and China withdrew declaring victory. Vietnam, on the other hand, felt it had given China a bloody nose to serve as a warning that it would not be bullied. That was decades ago and in the intervening years China has spent billions expanding its army, navy and air force. Any future conflict between the two nations could result in a death toll that would make their last border war resemble a skirmish. Japan will be closely watching what happens because it too could find itself having to stand up to China’s tendency to threaten rather than seek compromise.