THE RETURN OF THE FIERY CLERIC

In public, he was always dressed in a dark turban and orthodox black robes. Rotund, his features were often contorted into an angry scowl, especially when he was trying to avoid the attentions of the western media. To the poor and underprivileged of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities he was a holy man, descended from the Prophet. To Americans, he was the fiery Muqtada al Sadr, one of the quintessential faces of the Iraq conflict until he suddenly vanished from the public eye in 2007.
By then, he had become the symbol of Shiite opposition to the American occupation and it was said he commanded a militia numbering hundreds of thousands of fighters, many of them from the slums of Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala. In fact, Sadr City, one of the most heavily populated and violent parts of Baghdad, was named after him. He was a lightning rod for dissent and it was rumored the Iraqi President, Nouri Al-Maliki was terrified he would use his power with the masses to dominate or overthrow the country’s fledgling parliamentary system. For Americans in Iraq, this young cleric epitomized militant Islam and it was even alleged he was influenced by Iranian clerics and by that country’s political and military leaders. That may have been a convenient piece of propaganda to depict a major critic of the occupation because no proof has ever emerged to show he was run by, or took money from the mullahs in Teheran. Instead, evidence has surfaced that had had allies in Iran but he did not want Iraq to be dominated by its neighbor.
From the outset of the Iraq war, he made no bones about his dislike of the U.S. occupation. His opposition became violent in 2004 when his supporters in what became known as the Mahdi, or sometimes the Mehdi Army, fought U.S. forces in Karbala and Najaf. Prior to that, his militia had fought only small battles with fellow Shiites and U.S. troops. The more sustained fighting in 2004 indicated a major shift in his power base. Madhi militamen were soon heavily involved in a growing sectarian war with Sunnis, resulting in horrific bloodletting. During 2006-2007, clashes between his fighters and U.S. troops in Sadr City, and between his militia and British forces in Basra, led to him being depicted as the bette noir in most U.S. media new reports about the conflict. He was portrayed as more dangerous than Al Qaeda and it was claimed he was alleged he was taking orders directly from Teheran.
In 2007, General Petraeus decided he would have to crush the Madhi Army in Sadr City if he was to bring peace to Baghdad. When Iraqi president, Nouri al-Maliki learned of the plan he told Muqtada al-Sadr to go into hiding otherwise he would be arrested or possibly killed by the Americans. Al Maliki had no desire to see Al Sadr behind bars or killed because it would have made him a martyr. Behind bars, especially, he was likely to become an even greater focus for opposition to the Iraqi government and the occupation. There have been rumors it was the U.S. who told Al-Maliki to warn the young cleric of the impending plan for Sadr City.
Al Sadr took the advice and went into hiding with his family. The U.S. military spin machine quickly launched a rumor that he had fled to Iran, leaving his militia army to its fate. While it is not known if he hid out in Iran it is clear he still managed to exert influence over his fighters. For example, he ordered a truce in the fighting between them and the rival Shiite Badr Brigades and extended it in February 2008. One of his most noticeable acts was the posting of a decree requiring his supporters to devote more time to studying the Koran and the announcement that he had retired to a religious studies retreat in Iraq. Some reports suggested the retreat was really in Qom, Iran’s holiest city. It was from there the Ayatollah Khomeini, father of the Iranian Revolution, emerged to unseat the Shah.
In recent weeks, it came as something of a surprise to many Iraqis, and no doubt to observers in Washington, when Al Sadr resurfaced in the Turkish capital, Istanbul, accompanied by scores of supporters and 30 Iraqi parliamentarians who had continued to do his bidding while he was in hiding. Journalists who saw him in Turkey wrote that he looked a lot older than his 36 years and his demeanor was no longer that of the stern, fiery orator. Instead, he resembled a wise and subdued politician. The visit to Turkey happened a week after President Obama visited the country. It signaled that Al Sadr had not abandoned plans to play a major role in a new Iraq in which the U.S. would soon have a diminished role. Al Sadr was no doubt aware that his formidable clerical opponent in Iraq, Aziz al-Hakim, formerly leader of the Badr Brigades, was terminally ill and no longer posed a challenge to him seeking control of Iraq’s Supreme Islamic Council.
While in Turkey, Al Sadr said he would continue to oppose the U.S. occupation by non-violent means only. On his mind was probably the deal Washington struck with the Iraqi government, which requires the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from towns and cities by the end of the summer. That will leave him, his parliamentary bloc and his many supporters enough time to plan for the day when Iraq will be in control of its own destiny.
What America has to accept is that Al Sadr never abandoned his oft stated principle that he wanted to see an Iraq in which Sharia Law dominated life. It would therefore not be unreasonable to conclude that he sees a future Iraq as an Iranian style theocracy. His critics in the West, and in Israel, like to depict him as a dangerous fanatic with the potential to emulate Hassan Nasrallah, the clerical leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Nasrallah has cleverly fused politics and religion to become one of the most respected figures in the Arab world. There is no evidence to prove Al-Sadr sees the Nasrallah persona as the kind he would like to fashion for himself. Instead, there is evidence of him reaching out to Sunnis, hoping to forge an alliance to make Iraq great again so that it can stand tall in the Arab world. But that approach will not find favor with secular-minded Sunnis if it is tied to extreme Islamic beliefs.
Self interest defines much of what happens in Iraq and Al Sadr, the Turks and the Sunnis have one thing in common. They bitterly oppose plans by the Kurds to establish an autonomous region in the north of Iraq with the massive oil reserves of Kirkuk under their feet. In the coming months, one might well see AL Sadr back in the headlines in Iraq, reshaping his role as a political heavyweight for the battles to come. He may even rebuild his relationship with Nouri Al-Maliki and form a political collation with him to dominate elections later this year.
Al Sadr’s exile did not last long and, contrary to critics who thought he was a beaten man, it was always on the cards he would return because he saw it as his religious destiny. He chose a time that was right for him though it may not be to the liking of the U.S. as it winds down its Iraq operations, or as it tries to see into the future. Washington focused too much media attention on Al Sadr in the early stages of the occupation, thereby increasing his self image and forging his reputation as the man who was never willing to deal. In years to come, he will likely portray himself as the cleric who stood up to a superpower on behalf of Iraq’s masses. He will be made an Ayatollah and it is not inconceivable that in a decade or two Iraq rather than Iran will be run by an Ayatollah with the name, Al Sadr, who claims to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed.

IRAQ A REAL HEADACHE FOR OBAMA

The war in Iraq now belongs to Barack Obama and it is steadily becoming a major political and military headache that will challenge the exit plans he outlined on the campaign trail.
It is said that politicians make so many promises when they are campaigning for office that the public rarely remembers many of them. That will surely not be the case over the war in Iraq where a recent upsurge in major terror attacks has raised the stakes for the U.S. military and for an Obama administration that has promised a complete withdrawal by 2011.
After he became president, Obama promised that two combat brigades totaling 12,000 troops would be withdrawn in six months as part of a strategy to end major combat operations by August 2010. Recently, while addressing troops at Camp Lejeune in N. Carolina, he declared he would have all U.S. troops out of Iraq by then end of 2011. By announcing that the Iraq occupation would be over in less than two years he pleased much of his base but his announcement did not sit well with some U.S. military leaders who fear that exact deadlines are not helpful because they set goals that may be impossible to meet if events on the ground dictate a renewed U.S. commitment. Obama has, of course, allowed himself considerable political leeway should he have to reverse course in the coming months. His front men have been pointing out that “conditions on the ground” could lead to an altering of the withdrawal deadline. That deadline was first set out in the Status of Forces Agreement signed by President Bush and the Iraqi government prior to him leaving office. But the Bush White House always expected the agreement would not be followed to the letter of the law because they had left enough scope within its complex framework to allow for a sizeable number of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq for another decade or more.
It now seems that the Obama White House and the Pentagon are at odds over that aspect of Iraq policy, with the latter using senior military figures to state that the SOFA agreement will likely be renegotiated. It is a public relations tactic that has drawn some swift rebukes in private from the White House yet it points to an underlying divergence of opinion about the handling of Iraq. At the core of the dispute is the Pentagon position that Article 27 of the agreement permits the U.S. to take military action “or any other measures” inside Iraq’s borders after 2011 to defend against external or internal threats. Maintaining that option would require keeping at least 50,000 troops in the country. It is worth noting that the U.S. has the world’s largest embassy in Baghdad, which was built with the aim of managing a sizeable U.S. presence for decades to come. The Pentagon would like Obama to renegotiate the agreement to ensure that flexibility beyond 2011 will not jeopardized by a future Iraq administration that takes its orders from Iran.
From Obama’s perspective, his promises of deadlines may prove wishful thinking if the recent mass killings by Sunni and Al Qaeda terrorists result in a renewed sectarian conflict on a scale that existed before the troop surge led by General David Petraeus in 2007. The surge proved successful in western Iraq in particular but some aspects of the strategy raised issues that may now have roots in the recent violent upsurge and the growing friction between Sunni militias and the Iraqi Shiite government of Nouri Al-Maliki.
A significant part of the surge was the role of what became known as the Awakening Councils – Sunni militias willing to fight on the U.S. side against Al Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents. In what would eventually become a $500 million project – cost of weapons and training not included – the Pentagon chose to describe the militias in internal memos as “Concerned and Local Citizens Groups,” even though they hardly matched that description. Many were former Baathists and soldiers in Saddam Hussein’s army, while a large number were insurgents who had fought against the U.S. presence from the start of the occupation. But, by joining the U.S. “war on terror,” the leaders of the Councils saw a distinct political advantage being allied with Washington. They were also happy that the Pentagon wanted to pay monthly salaries to their fighters. Before long, the Councils had 100,000 armed men at their disposal and they were critical in helping the U.S. put down the insurgency and destroy the power of Al Qaeda in Anbar province and across western Iraq. Many Awakening members were targeted for assassination by Al Qaeda and a large number lost their lives.
The Iraq prime minister, Nouri Al-Maliki never liked that part of the U.S. surge policy, arguing that it armed Baathists. He also warned that it was dangerous for the U.S. to train thousands of Sunni militiamen, who might later use their skills to destabilize the country in the event of a civil war. Nevertheless, the U.S. military command benefited so much from the militias it later put pressure on al-Maliki and his government to begin a process of integrating them into the military as a way of keeping them employed and making them part of the solution. Last November, the U.S. stopped paying the militias and turned over their handling to the Iraqi government. So far, the transition has been less than smooth even though there was agreement that 54,000 members of the Baghdad Awakening would be swiftly incorporated into the Iraqi army and given salaries. However, the massive drop in the price of oil, and the loss of oil revenues, has driven the Iraqi government close to bankruptcy. It has therefore been unable to pay salaries to many Awakening members.
Sunni fighters, who are closely watching U.S. troops leave Iraq, believe they will not get a good deal from a Shiite government that has a deep mistrust of them. They fear the moment the Obama exit plan gathers steam the Iraqi security forces will launch an all out effort to destroy the Awakening Councils and disarm their members. With that kind of mindset dominating debate within Sunni militias, there is a real risk those fighters will rejoin the insurgency in an effort to generate enough violence to keep the U.S. in Iraq beyond its exit deadline. That would give Sunnis time to work out a deal for their fighters to be incorporated into the Iraqi army, or time to build a large insurgent force capable of confronting the Iraqi army in the event of an all out sectarian civil war. Whatever happens, the prospect of more violence is real and it could derail White House plans for an exit by 2011. That would alter Barack Obama’s relationship with his base and with the Left in Congress. It could have an even broader impact on his wider political agenda.
If one is looking for signs of what the future may hold for U.S. policy in Iraq, the upsurge in violence in the past month is a worrying harbinger of things to come. But what happens after June when U.S. soldiers begin leaving Baghdad and other Iraqi cities will provide a clearer picture of the future. If it turns out to be a hot summer in Iraq, the Obama administration may be forced to reverse course at a time when it needs the troops in Iraq to win the war in Afghanistan.