AFGHANISTAN – A WATERSHED FOR OBAMA?

The Taliban’s latest rejection of talks with the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, showed the insurgents think they are winning and feel no urgency to lay down their arms to discuss a peaceful end to the war.
Karzai’s offer to provide safe sanctuary to Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, for roundtable discussions in Kabul, was roundly rejected by Omar’s deputy, who called Karzai an “American puppet” and warned he would be put on trial in an Islamic court once the Taliban returned to power. The offer to Omar stunned some international observers, given that Omar was the person who provided Osama Bin Laden with a safe haven before and after the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban chief went into hiding at the same time as Bin Laden and is believed to be living in Pakistan’s tribal lands along the border with Afghanistan. He has a $10 million bounty on his head, and along with Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Al Zawahiri, makes up the trio President Bush would most love to bring to justice.
The offer from President Karzai was not the first one he made to Mullah Omar. In 2006, he made an offer, which appeared to include amnesty, but soon backtracked under pressure from the White House. This time, while amnesty was not on the table, the approach was predicated on the basis he was prepared to resign if NATO and the US opposed it. But again, he was forced to modify his safe sanctuary proposition by pointing out that even though he was willing to sit down with Omar, the latter would have to “account for his action” and the Afghan government would always be “uncompromising” in its attitude to men like the Taliban Mullah.
“Our policy is clear. Omar is a criminal and he should be brought to justice” Karzai told Reuters.
That assertion appeared to conflict with his the offer of safe passage to Omar and showed once again that Karzai was not his own master. His latest overture to the Taliban coincided with the election of Barack Obama as president-elect and a statement by General David Petraeus, now in charge of Afghan war strategy, that his policy of reaching out to insurgents in Iraq could be applied to Afghanistan. The general said he felt there were Taliban fighters who might he prepared to break ranks with Mullah Omar and fight on the side of the Afghan army. However, there has been little evidence, if any, of that happening even though Hamid Karzai has made claims that hundreds of insurgents have left Taliban ranks.
Some military figures on both sides of the Atlantic believe the Iraq model of dealing with insurgents is not applicable to the Afghan conflict. They argue that, in Iraq, General Petraeus was able to pay and arm Sunni insurgents to fight Al Qaeda elements in Anbar province but in Afghanistan Al Qaeda is not the main insurgent force. Instead, the dominant group fighting the international security force is mostly Taliban, with several other militia organizations on the fringes of the conflict. For example, there are approximately 10,000 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, with similar number across the border in Pakistan. There are also four major militia groups that oppose the occupation. While they account for approximately 50,000 fighters, they lack the military cohesiveness of the Taliban as well as its considerable support in Pakistan. As for Al Qaeda, it has at most 1,500 to 2,000 trained insurgents and that estimate may even be too high.
Like Hamid Karzai, the Taliban are Pashtuns and there is no evidence that Pashtuns who leave the Taliban are ready to turn on their own tribe. Therefore, the Petraeus doctrine of recruiting insurgents to fight each other, or turn their guns on Al Qaeda, may be wishful thinking. It must be borne in mind that Afghans, especially the Taliban, have been close to Bin Laden over decades, going back to the Soviet occupation. It is unrealistic to assume they would now turn on him for U.S. money and weapons.
It is also a fact that the deterioration in the Afghan war is due in no small measure to the fact it was never given top priority by the Bush White House. In almost eight years of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. and its allies have been fighting a rear guard war. Each time U.S. and NATO troops have taken area from the Taliban, they have had to leave it because of a lack of manpower and within a short time the Taliban have re-taken the territory. The insurgents have also used the last eight years wisely, rebuilding their fighting strength by exploiting the lawlessness of the Pakistan tribal lands and the porous Afghan-Pakistan border. At the same time, the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai has been riven by corruption and has lost credibility. Its authority does not extend beyond the capital, Kabul, and its hold on power may be tested in elections in 2009.
The Taliban and their allies can also see that support for the war among NATO members is waning and that some NATO countries are unwilling to send more troops. Opinion polls show there is a desire internationally for an end to the conflict. A recent survey in Britain, which supplies the most NATO troops of any European nation, showed that a majority believe the war is lost and there should be a negotiated settlement that would permit a military exit within 12 months. A large majority of Germans, Dutch and Danes oppose any request from the U.S. for more troops. There has been criticism among NATO members, especially, the French and British, that German troops have had it relatively easy because they have remained in the peaceful north of the country. British newspapers recently quoted a survey that showed how the 3,000 German troops in Afghanistan drank almost two million pints of beer and 70,000 liters of a sparkling wine last year. The German Defense Ministry said it was normal consumption.
The American response to the war in Afghanistan has changed too. In 2002, 93% of the country agreed with sending troops to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban but in July 2008 only 59% believed it was important to send more troops. In September 2008, an online poll by Ipsos/Mc Clatchey found that 66% of Americans were against sending more troops and 74% believed it was time to plan a withdrawal. The war in Afghanistan has not gone well and some will say it was mismanaged by the Bush Administration. However, the questions now that really matter are whether a military victory is at all possible and whether leaving Afghanistan without destroying Al Qaeda would create a state that could become a haven for terrorists, drug lords and organized crime syndicates. On the other hand, Afghanistan is already a failed state since it is listed as number 10 on the global chart of failed nations. Nevertheless, the core issue is that we know what can happen when Afghanistan is allowed to function as it did before the attacks of 9/11. That in turns brings into question the limitations of the options available to the U.S. and NATO. One option is to feed more troops into the war and concentrate once and for all on destroying Al Qaeda, thereby opening the opportunity for someone like Karzai to negotiate a deal with tribal leaders, including Mullah Omar and his Taliban. Another option would be to go all out to defeat the insurgency but few military strategists believe a victory is possible. History demonstrates that such a course of action could be a costly and futile exercise in terms of human life. Declassified Soviet military documents show that Russia’s prolonged war in Afghanistan in the 1980s weakened its military, emboldened Islamic groups in the region and had serious domestic consequences at home. Finally, there is an option favored for some time by the British that feeds into General Petraeus’ thinking. That is to negotiate with the Taliban as the lesser of two evils and split them away from Al Qaeda and militias with a similar agenda. Perhaps that is why Karzai made the overture to Mullah Omar. The fact that it was rejected mattered less than the impression it created that the Afghan government and the US-NATO alliance were open to a serious dialogue.
President-Elect Barack Obama has pledged to make the war in Afghanistan and the search for Bin Laden top priorities. That begs the question is he is willing to commit to a large troop surge and end up getting bogged down in a country that has seen more than its fair share of failed occupations. On the other hand, he could reach out to Russia and Iran for help and bring more pressure to bear on Pakistan. That strategy could go a long way towards destroying the Al Qaeda base in that part of the world and to opening up opportunities for dialogue with the main insurgent groups. Russia has a vested interest in seeing that Islamic fundamentalism in the region does not thrive and Iran has always insisted it is willing to provide the U.S. with assistance to bring down Al Qaeda. Few people realize that the Shiites of Iran and the Arabs that make up Al Qaeda are bitter enemies. Iran also shares a border with Afghanistan.
All in all, Afghanistan may well prove to be one of the most difficult hurdles for the incoming Obama Administration to overcome politically and militarily. The Afghan war will require a new and perhaps bold approach with no guarantee of a quick or satisfactory outcome. Victory is a word we are unlikely to hear if there is an exit strategy in the next four years.