GEORGIA: A SOMBER LESSON FOR NATO

Had Georgia been a NATO member as planned there could well have been a major stand-off between NATO and Russian armies in the Georgian province of South Ossetia on August 8.
NATO would have had no choice but to place the western alliance on full alert and the world would have been braced for the kind of clash of armies once envisaged during the Cold War.
Some observers now suspect that the Georgian leader, Harvard educated, Mikhail Saakashvilli, sent his army into the pro-Moscow separatist province of South Ossetia, believing Russia would not react because it would conclude he had US and NATO backing. There are conflicting reports about whether he consulted NATO or merely acted on instinct, convinced Washington would back him no matter what he did. He had previously made it clear to western leaders that he wanted to unite South Ossetia with Georgia following its breakaway with Russian support in the 1990s. Whether he had US backing for such a move is doubtful.
NATO must now sit back and contemplate what might have been had it gone ahead quickly by making Georgia and Ukraine NATO members in a region that is volatile and which Russia regards as its “near border.” At a NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, NATO leaders assured Georgia it would be granted membership but first it had to go through an investigative process, requiring it to comply with plans for ongoing reforms. Russia responded that it would be dangerous move to allow Georgia or Ukraine to join the NATO alliance.
Russia has worried for some time about Georgia’s plan to join NATO a plan that evolved in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Relations between Georgia and NATO deepened in the mid-1990s, especially after the “Rose Revolution” in 2003 when Georgia became a symbol for Washington of growing democracy within the former Soviet Bloc. In 2005, NATO and Georgia signed an agreement allowing the Alliance to use Georgia as a transit point for supplies sent to Coalition troops in Afghanistan.
The US was also heartened by Georgia’s commitment to the war in Iraq and the fact that it committed 2,000 to that conflict. In return, the US and Israel trained Georgia’s Special Forces and Washington contributed weapons and military know-how to the country’s army and air force. All the time, Russia was watching with alarm the pro-western stance of Georgia and the fact that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil-gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea ran through Georgia, by-passing Russia on its way to the Mediterranean. The Kremlin was also angry that Georgia was a likely site for elements of the US missile defense program.
Considering the significance of Georgia to the West and NATO it is hardly surprising the country’s president may have felt he had enough clout to impose his will on South Ossetia without having to worry about Russia. If that was his gamble, he made it without anticipating the fact that Russia was waiting for an opportunity to teach Georgia a lesson that would serve as a warning to the West not to expand NATO influence too close to its borders.
All of this raises serious questions about NATO and its leadership in Europe and Washington. Surely, NATO bosses warned the Georgian president not to invade South Ossetia and risk a major confrontation with the Russian Bear. If they did not issue such a warning they were caught napping and that implies deeps flaws within the transatlantic alliance.
It should have been obvious to NATO’s intelligence chiefs that Russia was hoping for a chance to flex its military muscles. Saakashvilli provided it. The Kremlin obviously calculated it was best to strike before Georgia became a NATO member. In the past 18 months, Moscow has been using its influence in South Ossetia to bait the Georgian leader. The Kremlin’s calculation was that Washington’s focus on Iraq and Afghanistan blinded it to issues in the Caucuses. Certainly, this episode took President Bush by surprise and the very fact he needs Russia’s influence to curb Iran leaves him with little clout when it comes to putting pressure on the Russians.
One of the major questions that must now be asked of NATO is why it not see this coming and why it did not take steps to show Georgia there was a better way to deal with the South Ossetia than provoking a Russian military response at this time. A seminal issue that faces Washington and Brussels is whether, given what has transpired, it is wise to go ahead with transitioning Georgia to a full NATO membership. As for the Ukraine it must be thinking that its chances of joining NATO have just been placed in cold storage by the leaders of the alliance.
As for NATO, after its promise to make Georgia a member it must find a way to assert its authority again if it is to have any credibility in that region. It will have to make it clear to Russia that aggression doesn’t pay and the West will not be intimidated just because Russia feels insecure. If the present leaders of the Alliance are unsure what to do next they should take lessons from the playbook of the late President Ronald Reagan and his closest ally, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. They were firm in their dealings with the Kremlin and were also skilled at isolating it internationally when it stepped out of line. In his last months in office it is doubtful George Bush has those abilities and the same applies to his British counterpart, Gordon Brown. The Kremlin may well recognize that to be the case and exploit NATO weaknesses until new leaders are elected in America and Britain.
In the final analysis this is an issue NATO will have to study carefully because next time it may find itself in deeper waters as Russia continues to yearn for its past glory.