DEADLINE LOOMS FOR IRAQ "AGREEMENTS'

Two agreements that will define the future relationship of the United States and Iraq are due to be signed in July but the deadline may not be met if opposition to them builds within the Iraqi parliament and if Pentagon planners are unable to finalize the exact terms of the agreements.
At the end of last year, the White House announced the president had reached a “video-phone” consensus with his Iraqi counterpart on the long term standing of the two nations and the terms of a legal status for US forces now in Iraq, as well as those that will be there years from now. The need to resolve those issues was motivated by a realization that December 2008 would bring to an end the UN mandate permitting US intervention in Iraq. There has been much debate about whether the proposed agreements, reached only in principle by President Bush, represent a framework for treaties. The White House says they are merely agreements but some experts point out that agreements of that nature, particularly when they relate to the future of US policy in Iraq, will in effect be treaties when signed by two sovereign governments. The Bush White House position is that a strategic partnership deal does not require Congressional oversight and approval because it will by definition be an agreement and not a treaty. That position has angered many democrats who see the move as an attempt to by-pass Congress and tie the hands of the next president when shaping an Iraq policy.
Irrespective of the debate about how the deal with Iraq should be defined, there is uncertainty about what the “agreements” will mean. One is called the Strategic Framework and the other the Status of Forces. The Status of Forces Agreement, known as SOFA, is purported to be the kind of agreement the US normally has in counties where there is a static US military presence such as Japan, Germany, S. Korea, Japan and the United Kingdom. Its purpose is to provide a legal framework for the operation of US military bases and personnel, with the specific aim of protecting US military and civilian personnel from being subjected to criminal jurisdiction in respect of certain crimes For example, it is generally an established SOFA principle that US courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by service personnel in the course of their duty or in commission of crimes against other service personnel. In Iraq, no SOFA has been in place and a substantial number of Iraqi parliamentarians are concerned such an agreement would give cover to the US military and to the contractors it and the State Department employ.
If, as the Bush administration now envisages, the US will have a long term military presence in Iraq then an SOFA is essential and has to be in place before the UN mandate expires in December otherwise US service members and contractors will have no legal protection from the Iraqi courts. In February 2008, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, addressed the issue by pointing out that the SOFA for Iraq would be no different from agreements with other nations such as Germany or Japan, as well as many other countries across the globe where US forces were based. However, he admitted there was still a lot of work to be done before the dynamics of the Iraq SOFA were agreed.
Just when it appeared the Bush Administration might have an easy ride on signing off on the agreements, a draft of the Strategic Framework Agreement was leaked to the media on March 7. It immediately caused a stir in Iraq where leading Shiites claimed it went far beyond any agreement the US had with other countries. They added that the draft document provided no limit on the numbers of US forces that could remain in Iraq or their legal powers in respect of Iraqi citizens.
In Washington, the leaked document raised eyebrows among leading democrats who said some of its wording promised that the US would be prepared to defend the internal and territorial integrity of Iraq, making it possible the US might have to intervene if a civil war broke out in the future, or if there were border skirmishes between Iraq and its neighbors.
Aside from the merits or otherwise of the proposed “agreements,” the planning for a strategic relationship can be seen in light of several key elements in US foreign policy. The building of the largest US embassy in the world in Baghdad indicated some time ago that the Bush White House saw a major, long term US commitment to Iraq. That was made clearer with the recent construction of a US military base near the border with Iran, as well as the planning for US bases in other parts of the country in the event of a draw-down of the present US complement of 150,000 service personnel and approximately 100,000 contractors.
Another element in any decision about the future of the US relationship with Iraq is oil and though that will not be defined within the Strategic Partnership Agreement, there can be little doubt it was on the minds of Vice-President, Dick Cheney and his advisers. His office has been central to formulating foreign policy as it relates to energy, going back to the early months of the Bush presidency.
US Middle East policy has been predicated for decades on the need to have a military presence on hand to protect a region that holds much of the world’s oil supplies. That has not changed though it has been given added impetus by the fact that Iraq has some of the world’s largest untapped reserves. In the minds of planners in Washington, it would be foolish for the US to leave Iraq entirely after liberating it from Saddam and having shed so much blood in the process. Leaving would give Iran an opportunity to expand not only its influence on the politics of Iraq but also on the dispersal and sale of its oil resources. That could prove a costly move for the US at some time in the future if an Iraq closely allied to Iran decided to cut off supplies to the West.
Iran has been quietly using its influence in Iraq to encourage the Shiite bloc in the Iraqi parliament not to sign off on the proposed agreements since they would guarantee a long term legal status for a US presence. But Iran is not alone in opposing the Bush plan. One of its major critics is the powerful Iraqi Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who is on record saying no such deal should be signed with the “US occupiers.” His voice alone could be sufficient to prevent progress on the agreements. Time is running out for the Bush Administration to get the agreements signed and as the July deadline nears, as well as the December deadline for the end of the UN mandate, nerves in Washington and the White House will likely be frayed and enormous pressure will be put on the Iraqi Prime Minister to live up to his word to persuade his parliament so sign off on the agreements.