FIERY IRAQI CLERIC BACK IN BUSINESS

The fiery Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who was once regarded a major obstacle to US policy in Iraq has reinvented himself after vanishing from the headlines. In recent weeks he has declared that his powerful militia, the Mahdi Army, will not attack US or Iraqi forces.
From a US perspective, it is good to have a truce with al-Sadr’s militia because it allows the US military to devote its energies to combating Sunnis insurgents and Al Qaeda elements. There is, however, a downside to al-Sadr’s new peace making persona. Behind the scenes, he has encouraged his militiamen to join the ranks of the Iraqi Army. Some observers have suggested that as many as 20,000 have signed up. They did so, not only at the behest of their leader but also on the advice of the Iraqi prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, himself a Shiite. In recent months, while he too has also kept a low profile, he has nonetheless been busy shoring up his political support among Shiites. To do that, he has had to court al-Sadr who commands a large following. They had been allies until earlier this year when al-Sadr openly condemned al-Maliki and resigned from the government, taking with him representatives of the Iraqi Accordance Front. Their walk-out led to a serious weakening of the government and left al-Maliki politically vulnerable. All that has now changed with these two men recognizing that together they can dominate the political landscape.
Sunnis and some other Shiites in government have been alarmed by this strange alliance and have threatened to bring down the government. That might just suit Al-Maliki. In the event of new parliamentary elections, he would be a force to be reckoned with, especially if al-Sadr was at his side. Sunnis say the issue that most disturbs them is the influx of militiamen into the Iraqi Army. They point out that many of those militiamen were directly involved in the senseless torture and slaughter of thousands of Sunni civilians. Al-Maliki has argued that it is better to have Shiite militiamen in uniform under a proper chain of command than on the streets where they pose a threat to law and order. In contrast, his critics say he and al-Sadr have initiated a strategy to place the Iraqi military under complete Shiite control.
The US has stayed out of the war of words over this issue because Washington’s priority is to defeat the insurgency and that is made easier by the truce with the Mahdi Army. As for militiamen joining the Iraqi army, Washington also believes it is better to have them in uniform and in barracks than face them at roadblock or have them roaming the streets murdering Sunni civilians. While the US has not commented on the new Iraqi political alliance, it is buoyed by the fact that al-Sadr, who had demanded earlier this year that the Iraqi government sever all ties to the Bush Administration until a US timetable for withdrawal was agreed, is now happy to leave that issue for discussion somewhere down the line.
Many commentators have been trying to figure out why the fiery cleric made a political U-turn. The answer may lie in several factors. After he left the government, it set its sights on taking down his militia. The US military carried out raids on Sadr City in Baghdad and arrested militia leaders. But no matter how concerted the drive was to weaken the Mahdi Army it survived intact and that convinced al-Sadr his organization was more formidable than the government or the US had imagined. He slowly realized, as did his Iranian backers, that if the Mahdi Army could wrap itself into the system politically and militarily it could be unstoppable. That is when a strategy was developed beginning with overtures to al-Maliki. He was only too happy to welcome the cleric back into the fold because he knew that to dominate Shiite politics in the year ahead he will need al-Sadr’s election machinery and the support of his followers. The second arm of the strategy was to persuade the Mahdi Army to send its men into the Iraqi military with the aim of eventually controlling it from within. From a Washington perspective, that part of the strategy is acceptable because it brings the Mahdi out of the shadows and into a formal negotiating process, making it an integral part of the state.
In the long run, however, al-Sadr and his supporters will strive to build an Iraqi state along the lines of the Iranian model. They have already declared their goal of introducing Islamic courts and Sharia Law. Sooner or later, they will also return to their stated doctrine of demanding that Washington must issue a withdrawal timetable. In the meantime, he will rebuild his Mahdi army under the noses of the US military.