OBAMA FOREIGN POLICY BECOMES BUSH-LIKE IN CENTRAL ASIA

As time passes, Barack Obama’s foreign policy in Central Asia is beginning to look very much like the one pursued by his predecessor, George Bush. There are reports that Obama is ready to buy the support of states that have been unreliable partners in the past, particularly Uzbekistan, which is run by a tin pot dictator, Islam Karimov, who boils his enemies alive.
In 2004, American Free Press exposed a deal George Bush made with Karimov during a secret 2002 meeting in the White House. Karimov was offered millions in aid, training for his military and tens of millions more for the use of a former Soviet air base that was an ideal site for launching U.S. strikes into Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The base, which became known as K2, also provided a corridor for supplies by road across the Afghan border into the northern Afghan stronghold of Mazar –i- Sharif, the base of General Dostum, a warlord who had thrown his support behind the CIA during the 2001 invasion. Dostum and Karimov had a good relationship and Dostum earned a cut from major heroin smuggling operations across the Afghan-Uzbek border.
One of the first real insights into the operations of Karimov and his regime was provided by the former British ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray. In 2005, this newspaper reported how Murray had warned his superiors in London that intelligence acquired from interrogations of detainees by the Uzbeks was extracted under torture and then passed to the CIA and British Intelligence. Efforts were subsequently made to discredit Murray and he was forced out of his post but time has proved him right. One of his most shocking memories occurred during his time in the British embassy in Tashkent. Six hours after he spoke to a professor, who complained to him about the Uzbek regime’s use of torture, a body was dumped on the professor’s doorstep. It was the professor’s grandson and the skin has been boiled off one of his arms.
The Bush administration’s cozy relationship with Karimov ended on July 30, 2005 when the Uzbek foreign ministry sent a telegram to the U.S. embassy in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent, basically telling the U.S. it had 180 days to move out of the K2 base. Nearly three months earlier, Karimov’s police and military had killed an estimated 800 protestors in the city of Andijan. The EU responded by blocking arms sales to the Uzbek military but the Bush Administration was careful not to take sides, with Donald Rumsfeld rejecting calls for an international inquiry. Eventually a bi-partisan group of senators demanded a UN investigation and the White House was forced to publicly express concerns about Uzbekistan. That prompted Karimov to tell the U.S. military to leave the K2 base.
The U.S. departure from K2 pleased Russia and China, which had long worried about a major U.S. military presence in the region. For the Defense Department and NATO, it meant relying entirely on the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan. That country’s leader soon began complaining he was not being paid enough rental cash. In February 2009, the Kyrgyzstan parliament rejected a U.S. offer of $60 million a year for Manas and voted to close it, resulting in it becoming a transit center. The uncertainty surrounding the U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan has long been tied up with the politics of the region. Even though Russia now earns a lot of money ferrying U.S. supplies to Afghanistan, it continues to fear the NATO presence in “The Stans.” That fear has been heightened by a growing awareness that NATO could be in Afghanistan for decades.
In the background, the Chinese have been stirring the political pot, warning that NATO is pursuing an expansionist policy in Central Asia. China’s rhetoric on the issue was particularly shrill after Kazakhstan hosted NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum on June 24-29, 2009. A week later, in a less angry tone, China encouraged the Russians to counter NATO through the CSTO, which is Russia’s version of NATO. The CSTO is comprised of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia has since decided to open a second air base in Kyrgyzstan to complement the four other military installations it has in that country. The Russian plan to expand its military presence in Kyrgyzstan did not please Karimov’s regime, which warned that the move could eventually destabilize the region. Much to the displeasure of the Chinese and Russians, the Uzbek leader has always been loose cannon. In 1999, they broke with the CSTO but later returned to it. Their recent criticism of Moscow is being seen in some circles as a desire to return to the U.S.-NATO fold. The argument goes that Karimov recognizes that NATO is going to be in Afghanistan for possibly decades and there is money to be earned by being part of the NATO effort. Therefore, if he re-opens the K2 base to NATO, it will mean the U.S. and its NATO allies will not need to pay Russia for airlifts of supplies to Afghanistan. Instead they can spend that money in Uzbekistan.
There is speculation in some Eastern capitals that the Pentagon and NATO HQ convinced Obama that the K2 base was essential to a long campaign in neighboring Afghanistan. Meanwhile, behind the scenes there have been secret talks in Washington and Brussels about renewing diplomatic ties with Karimov as a precursor to him re-opening the K2 base to NATO. It is believed unlikely, however, that any agreement will not lead to Obama rolling out the White House carpet for Karimov. Nevertheless, Obama will be following in the steps of his predecessor by mending fences with the Uzbeks. The move will require him to turn a blind eye to the excesses of the Uzbeks and to be ready to provide the large sums of money Karimov will demand. Some might argue that when you are fighting a long war you have to get into bed with unsavory people but Obama had better be careful when it comes to “The Stans.” Money can buy alliances in Central Asia but, while Russia and China continue to see NATO as the bogeyman, the White House had better be ready for some surprises. Alliances bought can quickly become alliances lost to a higher bidder.
In the meantime, the Chinese will continue to encourage Russia to draw a line across Central Asia by building military installations in CSTO member states. Moscow has been planning to do just that and has promising to pay handsomely for its installations and to spend lavishly on infrastructure projects. But, Moscow may not have enough money in its coffers to fulfill its assurances to CSTO leaders. In that event, China would probably be ready with a line of credit since it would prefer Russia took on the task of stopping NATO in its tracks.